Some updates on : I uploaded notes of past Crypto Law Seminars. I also "Claude Coded" llms.txt functionality and markdown versions for all posts (for LLMs). I'm more of a Python person, so I deliberately chose JavaScript-based 11ty as a site generator for this project to learn more about JS and to test Claude Code (with Max subscription). And I must say that this has been working very well. Adding llms.txt and raw markdown versions for all texts took me just a few minutes with Claude.

The REV vs MEV debate prompted me to update 'How I understand "MEV"?' (check goodcrypto [dot] net). I'm not convinced with defining MEV as just "out-of-protocol" or "state contention" revenue. Both state and block-space contention cause validator/sequencer revenue and both come from user competition for rivalrous uses of a blockchain. Block-space congestion happens when too many users want transactions included in one block, irrespective of the transaction ordering in that block. For example, multiple users bidding high gas fees to enter a crowded NFT mint. State contention occurs, for example, when two traders race to liquidate the same lending position, each raising fees to be executed first, even if the block itself is not full. Blockworks’ REV (Real Economic Value) metric covers both. It sums base fees (congestion), blob fees (data-bandwidth congestion), priority fees (a mix of congestion and contention) and additional builder bids (like MEV-Boost tips; likely to reflect contention). So REV is meant to capture both "in-protocol" and "out-of-protocol" revenue. But even REV doesn't capture all MEV. It doesn't take into account side-channel deals. In those deals, the real payment for transaction ordering may be routed off-chain (for example, a wire transfer, a crypto transfer on a centralized exchange) or at least through a more complex revenue-sharing agreement with on-chain payments which are not easily identifiable as such.

The REV vs MEV debate prompted me to update How I understand "MEV"? (check goodcrypto [dot] net). I'm not convinced with defining MEV as just "out-of-protocol" or "state contention" revenue. Both state and block-space contention cause validator/sequencer revenue and both come from user competition for rivalrous uses of a blockchain. Block-space congestion happens when too many users want transactions included in one block, irrespective of the transaction ordering in that block. For example, multiple users bidding high gas fees to enter a crowded NFT mint. State contention occurs, for example, when two traders race to liquidate the same lending position, each raising fees to be executed first, even if the block itself is not full. Blockworks’ REV (Real Economic Value) metric covers both. It sums base fees (congestion), blob fees (data-bandwidth congestion), priority fees (a mix of congestion and contention) and additional builder bids (like MEV-Boost tips; likely to reflect contention). So REV is meant to capture both "in-protocol" and "out-of-protocol" revenue. But even REV doesn't capture all MEV. It doesn't take into account side-channel deals. In those deals, the real payment for transaction ordering may be routed off-chain (for example, a wire transfer, a crypto transfer on a centralized exchange) or at least through a more complex revenue-sharing agreement with on-chain payments which are not easily identifiable as such.

1/ Legal regulation of MEV extraction is one of the largest threats to decentralized, permissionless crypto that almost no one is talking about. This is not just about “🥪 > straight to jail”. Imagine compulsory licensing for block producers or prosecutions of validators…