Quantum-resistant solutions have become a hot topic in recent discussions within the English-speaking crypto community, with many forward-looking projects joining this "future resilience" upgrade. Among them, #Sei has placed quantum security as a significant and urgent upgrade path within its Giga architecture. This also reflects that the engineering team behind #Sei is quite cutting-edge and innovative. This is one of the key indicators I use to assess whether a public chain is worth holding long-term. Today, let's take a look at #Sei's new ideas in the quantum-resistant field! 🧐 When most people hear "quantum computing threatens cryptocurrency," their first reaction might be to ask, "Does that mean wallets will be easily hacked in the future?" But the truth is far more complex. Quantum computers are not a universal key; they primarily exploit Shor's algorithm to break the "elliptic curve" signatures (like ECDSA, Ed25519) that we rely on today, which is the mathematical mechanism that proves "this money is mine" when we make transactions. Once quantum technology matures, hackers could theoretically forge signatures and directly transfer our BTC or SEI, which is the real "Q-day" risk. Currently, many solutions propose switching to a quantum-resistant signature, but is that really feasible? At first glance, it seems reasonable; NIST has already introduced new standards, such as ML-DSA (lattice-based cryptography) or SLH-DSA (hash-based). However, when I saw the calculations done by the Sei Giga team, I realized that the situation is far from simple. Quantum resistance is not just a mathematical problem; it is also a throughput disaster. Imagine this: Sei Giga aims to process 200,000 transactions per second (200k TPS). Currently, each transaction's signature is only 64 bytes, keeping the network bandwidth pressure manageable. But if we switch to the minimum quantum-resistant signature recommended by NIST, each one would require over 1300 bytes, consuming nearly 0.5 GB/s of bandwidth just for the signature data! Thus, many public chains that have worked hard to build "high-performance public chains" would instantly degrade into mere "signature data movers," while EVM would become an accessory. It's like putting tractor tires on an F1 car; no matter how good the engine is, it won't run. Therefore, the Sei team did not blindly follow the trend of "changing signatures" but instead proposed two smarter paths based on technical feasibility: 🟡 The first path: use zero-knowledge proofs to "package and compress" signature verification. Rather than having each node verify thousands of large and slow quantum-resistant signatures, it is better to let users or professional aggregators batch-verify first, then generate a very small zk-STARK proof, allowing the chain to only verify this zk proof, which is both fast and bandwidth-efficient. The benefit of this approach is that it shifts the bandwidth and computational pressure from the consensus layer to the off-chain market, preserving quantum security without sacrificing performance. Moreover, zk-STARK is inherently quantum-resistant as it is based on hashes, making it a perfect match. 🟡 The second path: "get on the bus first, check the ticket later," using economic incentives as a safety net. Sei Giga supports "delayed execution," allowing it to employ more flexible strategies: transactions first submit a hash commitment, the chain records the transaction, and when it comes time to settle, it verifies the signature. If someone submits a fake transaction, it relies on "staking collateral + challenge mechanism" to punish them; if you dare to commit fraud, I will confiscate your deposit. This essentially transforms a technical problem into an economic one: the cost of attack must far exceed the benefits. Sei's deep accumulation in DeFi and order book trading gives it a natural advantage in incentive design. But what impresses me the most is #Sei's quantum transition plan: no matter how perfect the cryptography is, if users do not upgrade, it amounts to zero. Sei's proposed "dual-key transition period" strategy is pragmatic; before Q-day arrives, it allows users to bind an existing private key to a quantum-resistant public key. During the transition period, both keys can be used; afterward, the old system will be gradually phased out. It's like replacing the power grid of an entire city; you can't cut off the power overnight; you need to install new lines first and then gradually switch over. ...